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 Motor vehicle recalls occur frequently in the United States. The number of motor 
vehicles being recalled has been increasing substantially over time. This paper examines 
whether the number of vehicles recalled per month has an effect on the shareholder’s 
monthly abnormal return. Monthly abnormal return is the return which cannot be 
explained by the overall movement of the market. Five major auto manufacturers are 
included in this analysis with data ranging from April 2005 to December 2014. Two 
techniques are used in this paper; first, I use a series of ordinary least squares models 
followed by a series of mean comparison t-tests. Overall, the results indicate that the 
number of vehicles recalled per month provides little explanatory power of monthly 
abnormal returns. The one exception is Ford, from which the OLS results indicate that a 
10 percent increase in the amount of vehicles recalled (initiated by the manufacturer) 
result in a 7.8 percent decrease in abnormal return. However, this result became weaker 
in significance and magnitude with the addition of control variables. The majority of the 
results indicate that the number of recalled vehicles does not affect shareholder’s monthly 
abnormal return. It is likely that other attributes are more important and this suggests that 
direct costs of recalls are minimal. The results support the previous literature of Rupp 
(2003), who found the number of vehicles recalled had an insignificant effect on 







With several recalls typically announced each month, motor vehicle recalls occur 
frequently in the United States. These recalls are carried out to correct defective vehicles. 
A single recall campaign can affect less than a hundred vehicles or tens of millions of 
vehicles. Recall campaigns are not always severe or safety-related. The direct and 
indirect costs to the manufacturer vary significantly between campaigns. The number of 
vehicles being recalled has been substantially increasing since the 1960’s, especially in 
recent years.  
Rupp (2003) found that the number of vehicles recalled provided little explanatory 
power for abnormal returns to shareholders using data from 1973-1998. The motivation 
behind this paper is due to the large increases in the size and number of recalls over the 
past ten years. This paper looks to readdress Rupp’s findings using more recent data and 
a different technique. Rather than using a two- or three-day window surrounding 
individual recall announcements, as the majority of previous literature has done, this 
paper will use aggregated monthly data. Due to the large amount of recall campaigns and 
difficulty determining when investors first learned of a recall, this paper will attempt to 





abnormal return for five manufacturers. These manufactures include Honda, Ford, GM, 
Toyota and Nissan.  
To accomplish this, two techniques will be used. First, a series of ordinary least 
squares regressions will be estimated between abnormal return and the number of 
vehicles recalled. Second, a series of mean comparison t-tests will be conducted to 
estimate differences in mean abnormal returns between designated groups. First I will 
address the latest trends in automobile recalls followed by previous literature on the topic. 
Then I will discuss the data and methodology used in the analysis. Lastly, I will conclude 






















In 2014, over 60 million vehicles were recalled in the United States, breaking the 
record of 30.8 million vehicles in 2004, according to data from the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). General Motors recalled over 28 million 
vehicles in 2014, setting a new record for any single auto manufacturer. The number of 
vehicles being recalled in the United States has been increasing since the NHTSA first 
started instituting them in the 1960’s. Also increasing is the average number of vehicles 
affected per recall. Figure 1 below displays both the increases in recall campaigns as well 












Figure 1: Unique Campaigns and Units Affected by Decade 
 
Steinkamp, Neil, and Jake Reed. Report on Automotive Warranty Claims and OEM Recalls (2014) 
 
There are several explanations for why auto recalls have increased in the U.S. First 
of all, more vehicles are being sold and vehicles are becoming more complex every year. 
Cars continue to advance in technology and equipment over time. A report by the Society 
of Automotive Analysts (SAA) explained, “The rise in non-engine and electrical related 
recalls suggests an increasing impact from vehicle technology” (Steinkamp et al. 2014). 
This means cars are being produced with more complicated parts, increasing the chance 







In addition, auto manufacturers are saving money in production by using 
interchangeable parts, or parts that are used in multiple models. Using interchangeable 
parts is not a new concept. Henry Ford used interchangeable parts and an assembly line in 
the early 1900’s in order to maximize production and reduce costs. Designing and testing 
parts is an expensive process, so producing one ignition switch for all models is cheaper 
than designing a unique ignition switch for each model. Interchangeable parts save time 
and money in the production of cars. However, when one part is recalled it can 
potentially affect millions of vehicles across multiple lines rather than just one.  
 Along with using interchangeable parts, auto manufacturers also outsource many 
of the parts that go into their cars. Outsourcing parts can be cheaper for the manufacturer. 
However, it can also increase the chance of a recall occurring since the manufacturer 
does not have total control over the production and quality of these parts. The SAA report 
notes that, “Increasing number of OEM/supplier collaboration agreements” and 
“automakers’ increasing efforts to recover costs from suppliers” are both factors 
(Steinkamp et al., 2014). Manufacturers are not only outsourcing; they are pushing for 
parts to be made more cheaply by the subcontractors. Figure 2 below displays the total 











Figure 2: Time Series Summary of Recall Trends 
 
Steinkamp, Neil, and Jake Reed. Report on Automotive Warranty Claims and OEM Recalls (2014) 
 
Finally, an additional reason for the increase in auto recalls is due to regulators 
punishing auto manufactures for not delivering recall data quickly enough. For example, 
Toyota was fined $1.2 billion dollars in 2010 for its handling of the unintended 
acceleration problems. Attorney General Eric Holder said, “Today, we can say for certain 
that Toyota intentionally concealed information and misled the public about the safety 
issues behind these recalls.”
1
 Penalties such as this one imposed on auto manufacturers 
are a message to automakers that they need to find and address problems quickly and 
honestly. Similar penalties will potentially increase the number of recalls auto 
manufacturers initiate in order to prevent bigger losses to profit and reputation.  







 The increases in the number of vehicles being recalled over time is the motivation 
behind this paper. Do larger auto recalls mean larger losses for shareholders? Auto recalls 
involve substantial costs for manufacturers. Direct costs associated with a recall include 
the cost of notifying consumers as well as all the costs associated with correcting the 
defects. These direct costs are difficult to measure since recall announcements are not 
required to give estimated repair costs per vehicle. However, direct cost per vehicle can 
vary significantly. Indirect costs include the damage done to the reputation of the 
manufacturer that can lead to reduced sales or prices in the future. These indirect costs 
are more long-term in nature. This paper will examine whether or not a significant 
negative relationship exists between the number of vehicles recalled per month and the 
abnormal return for shareholders. In the next section previous literature on market 



















 Equity responses to auto recalls have been examined in previous literature by 
several researchers. The findings have been somewhat ambiguous. With the magnitude of 
auto recalls, researchers tend to select a relatively small sample to study, which might 
explain the varying results. For example, Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) found that 
shareholders suffered significant losses from the recall announcements. They used a 
sample of only 116 “major recalls” that occurred between 1967 and 1981. They analyzed 
cumulative excess returns for different sized windows surrounding recall announcements. 
Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) also found significant spillover effects on competitor’s stock 
prices.  
Interestingly, Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1988) revisited Jarrel and Peltzman’s work 
and found errors in the data set. They made some revisions and found that “little 
significant evidence remains indicating that security markets penalize shareholders for an 
automotive recall by driving down share prices” (Hoffer et al. pp.669). In another paper 
Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1987) found significant negative abnormal returns surrounding 
the announcement of “severe” safety recalls.  
Barber and Darrough (1996) examined 507 recalls for six manufacturers from 
1972-1992. They found significant shareholder losses surrounding recalls for the 





prices. Their finding conforms to the results of Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) that recall 
campaigns affect the shareholder value of the announcing firm, but it contradicts the 
conclusion that competitors are affected. However, this contradicts the finding of Hoffer 
et al. (1988) who did not find significant shareholder losses to the announcing firm.  
In more recent literature, Rupp (2001) examined whether or not government-
initiated recalls are more damaging than manufacturer-initiated recalls for shareholders. 
In doing so Rupp (2001) found significant equity losses surrounding recall 
announcements but did not find a significant difference in effects between the initiator of 
the recall. In this analysis, Rupp used recall data for six manufacturers from 1973-1998. 
In another paper, using the same data, Rupp (2003) examined the attributes of a costly 
recall. He found that the number of vehicles recalled provided little explanatory power of 
abnormal returns for manufacturers. Given these results, Rupp (2003) suggested that the 
direct recall costs are minimal. Rupp’s results indicate that shareholder losses are more 
sensitive to the component category being recalled rather than to the size of the recall.  
 Given the substantial increases in the amount of vehicles being recalled as 
discussed earlier, this paper looks to readdress the effect the number of vehicles recalled 
has on the manufacturer’s abnormal return. This paper differs from previous literature on 
two fronts. First of all, abnormal return is calculated month to month rather than using a 2 











DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to capture a potential relationship between the number of vehicles recalled 
per month and monthly abnormal return, two techniques will be used. First, a series of 
ordinary least squared regressions will be estimated. For each manufacturer selected, 
abnormal monthly return is regressed on the number of vehicles recalled per month. The 
expectation is that the coefficient on the number of vehicles recalled will be negative and 
statistically significant. If this were the case it would indicate that as the number of 
vehicles recalled increases, the abnormal return decreases. Later, control variables are 
added to the regressions to see how it affects the results. The main equations I will be 
estimating are shown below:  
1. 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵1 ln 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑒ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
and 
2. 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵1 ln 𝑉𝑒ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑(𝑚𝑓𝑟)𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2 ln 𝑉𝑒ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 (𝑔𝑜𝑣)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Where AR = Abnormal Return, I = manufacturer, t = month, (mfr) = manufacturer 






Second, a series of Welch
2
 mean comparison t-tests will be conducted. The 
purpose of these tests is to look for differences between mean abnormal returns in 
different groups of months classified by the number of vehicles recalled. The first test 
will compare months with zero recalled vehicles to months with greater than zero 
vehicles recalled. The second test will compare months in which the number of vehicles 
recalled is greater than the median verses less than the median. The third test will 
compare months where the number of vehicles recalled is in the top 25
th
 percentile versus 
the bottom 75
th
 percentile. In the second and third tests, months in which zero vehicles 
were recalled are omitted. Welch’s t-test is used since it does not require the assumption 
of equal variance and sample size. Next, the data collection and manipulation will be 
addressed before discussing the results and interpretations.  
Data for auto recalls is available online from the NHTSA recall database
3
. The 
NHSTA was established by the Highway Safety Act of 1970 and is responsible for 
setting and enforcing safety performance standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
equipment. They also keep records on automobile recalls in a publicly available dataset. 
The NHTSA has recorded all U.S. auto recalls since 1966. For each auto recall the 
NHTSA records the manufacturer, year, make, and model. The dataset also includes 
details about each recall, including the initiator of the recall, dates regarding the status of 
the recall, a defect summary, and the potential number of units affected. This paper 
focuses on the “number of units affected” variable since it indicates the magnitude of the 
                                                          
2
 Welch, B. L. (1947). The generalization of `Student's' problem when several different population variances are  







recall. For ease of reading the “number of units affected” variable will be referred to as 
the number of ‘vehicles recalled’ throughout the paper.  
 This paper uses a sample of five manufacturers including both domestic (General 
Motors and Ford) and Japanese manufacturers (Honda, Nissan, and Toyota). According 
to Edmunds
4
, these five manufacturers accounted for 65.8 percent of the U.S. market 
share in January 2015. The sample is limited to 117 monthly observations ranging from 
April 2005 to December 2014 with the exception of General Motors. Due to General 
Motor’s Chapter 11 reorganization in 2009, all stock price data prior to December 2010 is 
unavailable. Due to this issue the analysis for GM is limited to 49 monthly observations.  
 This paper uses monthly observations in order to analyze whether or not having 
larger auto recalls is more damaging for the shareholder’s monthly abnormal return. To 
accomplish this, the auto recalls are aggregated into monthly observations, rather than 
analyzing the individual effects of each recall like previous literature has done. The 
NHTSA dataset includes the date the owner is notified for each individual recall. The 
number of vehicles recalled is aggregated into months by the date the owner is notified 
while keeping government and manufacturer initiated recalls separate. By aggregating the 
recalls separated by initiator, we have the total vehicles affected by recall(s) per month. 
After aggregating the data, we are left with five monthly time series data sets, one for 
each manufacturer. Table 1 below displays the average, minimum and maximum number 
of vehicles affected by recalls per month during the sample period. The number of 







vehicles affected ranges from zero to a maximum of over 6.5 million in one month for 
General Motors.  
 
Table 1: Number of Vehicles Affected by Recall(s) per Month (Apr 2005-Dec 2014) 
 
Since the number of vehicles recalled has such a large range, the natural logarithm 
is used in the statistical analysis. This will make interpretations easier as well. For each 
manufacturer, monthly stock prices were collected from Yahoo Finance for the sample 






In order to calculate abnormal returns, the S&P 500 Index data were also collected 
from Yahoo Finance. Monthly returns for the S&P 500 were calculated using the last 
equation above. The abnormal return is calculated using the market model equation 
where: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    ,     where t = month, I = ith stock 
n
Manufacturer Months Average Min Max Average Min Max
GM 49 516,528 0 6,576,706 210,664 0 2,519,424
Ford 117 63,867 0 1,572,829 196,671 0 4,500,000
Nissan 117 64,969 0 1,248,032 22,297 0 665,210
Toyota 117 189,369 0 4,445,109 105,868 0 3,300,008
Honda 117 64,969 0 1,248,032 22,297 0 665,210





This ordinary least squared regression calculates the return for each manufacturer 
that can be explained by the overall movement of the market. The results from this initial 
regression are shown below in Table 2.  
Table 2: Market Model Results Using S&P 500 
 
 
The residual from the above equation is equal to the abnormal return for the ith 
manufacturer’s stock. The residual represents the return for the manufacturer that cannot 
be explained by the overall movement of the market. This is what will be used in the 
main OLS regressions noted above by the term AR.  
Several control variables were collected from the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Economic Data website which will be used in the OLS regressions
5
. These variables are 
listed below in Table 3 with their summary statistics. Not all control variables were 
significant for all manufacturers. They are used to see how the initial significant results 
change with the addition of controls.  
 
                                                          
5
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
Manufacturer Coef. t-stat Adj. R2 n
GM 1.71*** 5.66 0.39 49
Ford 2.1*** 6.60 0.27 117
Nissan 1.37*** 8.75 0.39 117
Toyota 0.68*** 5.82 0.22 117
Honda 0.80*** 6.35 0.25 117






Table 3: Control Variables Summary Statistics 
 
 
Finally, for the mean comparison tests, the mean abnormal return is calculated for 
a series of groupings. The first grouping is months with zero recalled vehicles as opposed 
to months with any number of recalled vehicles. The second grouping is months in which 
the number of recalled vehicles is less than or more than the median number of recalled 
vehicles. The third grouping is months in which the number of recalled vehicles is less 
than or more than the 75
th
 percentile of the number of recalled vehicles. This is done 
separately for each manufacturer. Mu (µ) is the average abnormal return for each group 
and n represents the number of months in each group. The median and 75
th
 percentile 
number of vehicles recalled is calculated using only months in which recall(s) have 




Variable n Mean Std. Dev Min Max
% chg oil prices 117 0.301 8.722 -28.200 22.600
% chg gas prices 117 0.213 7.134 -29.600 16.800
% chg CPI private transp. 117 0.130 2.054 -10.800 6.200
Fed Funds Rate 117 1.585 2.039 0.100 5.300
% chg housing index 117 -0.044 0.924 -2.000 1.700
% chg disp. Income 117 0.166 0.911 -5.900 4.800





Table 4: Mean Abnormal Returns for Different Groups 
 
   
 The null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis for the mean comparison t-tests are 
shown below. The null hypothesis asserts that the difference in means is equal to zero. 
The alternative hypothesis asserts that the difference in means is not equal to zero. In the 
next section, I will discuss the results for both the OLS regressions and mean comparison 
tests. Additionally, interpretations will be made based on these results. 
 
3. 𝐻𝑜: 𝜇1 − 𝜇2 = 0 







VA=Vehicles Affected GM Ford Nissan Toyota Honda
n=months n µ n µ n µ n µ n µ
No recall 5 -5.39 17 0.65 44 -0.12 38 -0.81 44 -0.27
Recall 44 0.61 100 -0.11 73 0.07 73 0.39 73 0.16
VA>median 22 1.13 50 -2.28 37 1.02 39 0.85 37 0.07
VA<median 22 0.09 50 2.06 36 -0.35 40 -0.06 36 0.26
VA>75th % 11 1.04 25 -0.11 19 2.68 19 1.32 19 1.31








RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
First, the results for the ordinary least squared regressions will be discussed. The 
results for equation 1 and 2 are shown in Table 5 below. Model 1 is a regression of 
abnormal return on the log of vehicles recalled separated by the initiator (MFR/GOV). 
Model 2 is a regression of abnormal return on the log of total vehicles recalled per month. 
As can be seen, there is only one statistically significant result in Model 1, namely Ford. 
Interestingly, only the number of vehicles recalled which were initiated by the 
manufacturer is significant for Ford. The coefficient of -0.779 is interpreted in the 
following manner: For a 10 percent increase in the number of vehicles recalled we expect 
a 7.8 percent decrease in abnormal return. In Model 2, GM and Toyota have statistically 
significant coefficients; however, they are only statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. Also, both have a positive sign suggesting a positive relationship between the 
number of vehicles recalled and abnormal return. These results are the opposite of what 











Table 5: OLS Results Excluding Control Variables  
 
 Adding control variables to Model 1 did not change anything for GM, Nissan, 
Toyota and Honda. As expected the variables of interest remain statistically insignificant. 
The significant result for Ford, however, remained significant with the addition of control 
variables and the results are shown below in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Ford Model 1 OLS Results Including Controls 
 
Dependent Variable=AR GM Ford Nissan Toyota Honda
MODEL 1
ln Vehicles Recalled(MFR) 0.033 (0.779)*** 0.116 0.048 0.078
0.150 (2.700) 0.910 0.520 0.760
ln Vehicles Recalled(GOV) 0.252 0.276 0.007 0.147 (0.109)
1.460 1.110 0.040 1.500 (0.830)
R2 0.045 0.067 0.007 0.025 0.012
MODEL 2
ln Total Vehicles Recalled 0.383* (0.362) 0.055 0.148* 0.053
1.760 (1.240) 0.440 1.690 0.520
R2 0.062 0.013 0.002 0.024 0.002
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, p* p<0.1 
Independent Variables Coef T-stat
ln Vehicles Affected (MFR) (0.679)** -2.38
%change oil prices (L1) 0.53*** 2.810
%change Housing Index (3.54)** (2.260)
%change CPI (private transp.) (1.45)* (1.880)
%change autosales (L2) (0.309) (1.530)
FF Rate (L3) (1.17)* (1.670)
constant 6.09** 2.490






 As can be seen, when control variables are added the coefficient on the number of 
vehicles affected by manufacturer initiated recalls is now only significant at the 5 percent 
level. Before, it was significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, the coefficient is 
slightly smaller in magnitude. Now, a 10 percent increase in vehicles affected by 
manufacturer-initiated recalls results in a -6.8 percent effect on abnormal return. Without 
access to manufacturer-specific monthly data, it is difficult to create a model which 
explains a large percentage of the abnormal return for a specific manufacturer. With the 
inclusion of five significant control variables, the model only obtains an R-squared of 
0.18. This indicates that this model only accounts for about 18 percent of the variation in 
abnormal return. The purpose of this is to show how the magnitude and significance 
would change in a more complete model.  
The results for the mean comparison t-tests are shown in Table 7 below. The null 
hypothesis for this test is that the means are not significantly different from each other. 
Interestingly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all groups and all manufacturers. 
There is not a statistically significant difference in the mean abnormal return for months 
with a relatively large number of vehicles being recalled. These results correspond with 
the results from the OLS regressions so it is not surprising. Even months in which the 
number of vehicles recalled is in the top 25
th
 percentile the mean abnormal return does 
not have a statistically significant difference from months in the lower 75
th
 percentile.  




































































































































































































































































































































































































 Although the number of vehicles being recalled is continually increasing, the 
magnitude of recalls does not appear to have an effect on shareholder’s monthly 
abnormal return. In both tests, it appears that the number of vehicles recalled does not 
play a role in determining monthly abnormal return for manufacturers. Ford, the only 
exception, appears to have a negative relationship between manufacturer-initiated recalls 
and abnormal return. With a 10 percent increase in the number of vehicles recalled by 
Ford, shareholders experience a -7.8 percent effect on monthly abnormal return. 
However, the effect diminishes with the addition of control variables and it is difficult to 
determine how significant it would be in a more complete model. Based on the results 
from the mean comparison tests we are unable to conclude that larger recalls have a 
significant effect on abnormal return for all five manufacturers.  
The results are not that surprising since they correspond to the findings of Rupp 
(2003), who found that the number of vehicles recalled provided little explanatory power 
of abnormal returns even in a 2-day window surrounding the recall announcement. Rupp 
(2003) suggests that a reason for this is that direct costs to the manufacturer are minimal. 
Direct costs include the cost of repairs and notifying customers. It appears as if these 





reputation. Other attributes of recalls, as Rupp (2003) suggested, such as which 
component is recalled are likely more important in determining the abnormal return.  
 There are potentially some problems with aggregating the data into monthly 
observations. It is possible that the effects of the recalls are being washed out by other 
events throughout the month. There are numerous events that can cause a manufacturers 
stock price to change throughout the month. Events such as financial statements being 
released, negative or positive news related to the company, sales forecasts, economic 
conditions, insider information and many other factors can have a substantial effect on 
the monthly abnormal return. This is partly why the majority of previous literature 
examines 2 or 3-day windows surrounding recall announcements. This analysis could be 
improved by doing this but unfortunately with the magnitude of recalls it would likely 
take years to organize.  
 Another potential issue in drawing major conclusions from this analysis is the time 
span and scope of the sample. This paper analyzes just five manufactures over a 10 year 
time span. Ideally, all manufacturers would be included across the entire time span of the 
NHTSA recall dataset. This is potentially possible for future research given more time. 
The magnitude of recalls presents several issues. Investors may not react to each recall 
announcement since there are so many, and many never make it into the news. Also, 
given the mixed results from previous literature, it appears that the sample selection is a 
large determinant of the results found. Future potential research on this topic would 
include a larger time span with more manufacturers. Also, if the effects of recalls could 
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